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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
corporation, et al, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Implicit in the opinion of the Court is the doctrine that 
canal companies are insurers against damage by reason of 
non-use of water by stockholders on independent sub-lat-
erals; or in the alternative, that such companies must cut 
off their stockholders' water if by reason of rain an indi-
vidual user might not use his turn. It is believed that such 
opinion, if not modified will so handicap scores of compa-
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nies throughout the State, and so place an unmerited and 
impractical burden upon them, as to seriously interfere 
with the orderly distribution and beneficial use of the wa-
ters of this State, and, on the other hand, encourage indi-
vidual users to disregard their own reasonable responsi-
bilities. 
It is for these reasons that appellant, Provo Bench 
Canal and Irrigation Company, without re-arguing the 
sufficiency of the evidence concerning proximate cause on 
which it believes this Honorable Court also erred, but ad-
dressing itself squarely to the propositions of law neces-
sarily involved in the above mentioned serious implications 
and their claimed factual basis, has filed the following: 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
The petitioner, Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation 
Company, one of the defendants, and appellant herein, 
respectfully petitions for a rehearing before the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah, in this cause; that 
the cause be re-examined, and further argument be 
heard, and that upon such reconsideration, that the 
decision of the Court be modified and the judgment of 
the lower Court reversed, for the following reasons and 
upon the following grounds: 
I. That the assumed factual basis of the decision 
is not adequately supported by the record and contrary 
to the undisputed evidence. The Court erroneously 
assumed without support in the evidence, but contrary 
thereto, that the "Southeast Ditch" and the water 
therein, and, by the same token, the North Union Canal 
Company lateral and numerous other laterals and 
ditches, were under the control of the Provo Bench 
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Canal and Irrigation Company, and that such company 
was responsible for any flooding or non-use of water 
in these laterals and ditches. 
II. That the decision announces an erroneous and 
impractical rule of law, departing from the well estab-
lished rules of canal companies, based upon an assumed 
duty to shut off water flowing in laterals during rain 
storms on its own responsibility, which is contrary to 
practical irrigation methods and necessities as shown 
by the evidence and of which the Court should take 
judicial notice; that the effect of such decision would re-
quire such companies to deprive the great majority of 
their stockholders of necessary water for irrigation 
during periods when needed, would invite numerous 
lawsuits for failure to furnish water during rainstorms, 
and would, without adequate justification, shift respon-
sibility to canal companies from individuals directly 
responsible. 
III. That a modification of the decision is essen-
tial to the public interest, as well as in justice to ap-
pellant. The decision should be clarified and modified, 
not only in justice to the appellant, but in the public in-
terest, so as not to depart from the fundamental prin-
ciples governing the liability of canal companies and 
so as not to place unwarranted burdens upon canal 
companies and, at the same time, encourage irrespon-
sibility in the utilization of water by individual users. 
WHEREFORE, believing that a re-examination of 
the opinion and the record on which the case was de-
cided after further oral argument will result in a clari-
fication and modification of the decision in the public 
interest, your petitioner prays that a rehearing be gran-
ted, the present decision modified and the judgment of 
the lower Court reversed. 
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/ s / CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Provo Bench Canal and 
Irrigation Company 
Appellant and Petitioner. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Utah 
The undersigned hereby certifies that they are at-
torneys for the petitioner herein and that in their opin-
ion, the petition for rehearing is meritorious. 
/ s / A. H. Christenson 
/ s / A. Sherman Christenson 
Argument in support of the grounds stated in the fore-
going Petition will be presented in order: 
ARGUMENT 
I. The assumed factual basis of the decision is not ade-
quately supported by the record and is contrary to the rec-
ord. 
The Southeast Ditch and the water therein were not 
under the control of Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation 
Company, and its responsibility for unused water passing 
to the ends of branch laterals of that ditch was no greater 
than for any other water under the control of individuals 
requiring their water delivered to particular laterals . 
The opinion states that defendant "concedes that it 
brings the water from the river to the head of the South-
east Ditch and determines the amount of water which is 
turned into that ditch at its head and has control over the 
headgates, both at the river and at the heads of lateral." 
ss. 
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It is true that the appellant had control of the head-
gate where the water is turned into the Provo Bench canal 
from the river. Thus, when its officers reduced the flow of 
water in the canal as mentioned in the opinion, this had the 
effect of proportionately reducing the water in all the main 
laterals. The other conclusions mentioned by the opinion 
not only were not conceded, but are at variance with the 
record, and particularly does the record show that the 
Southeast Ditch and the waters therein are not under the 
control of the company. 
On this point we take the liberty of citing the portions 
of the record which it appears were not sufficiently con-
sidered by the Court in arriving at the conclusion it did: 
The stock of the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation 
Company is divided into 1954 shares (326), entitling the 
respective stockholders to their proportionate part of the 
waters of the canal. The company adds the shares to-
gether and gives each lateral its proportion of the measure-
ment in the weir according to the share on that lateral 
(330). Six hundred ninety-one shares are owned by the 
North Union Irrigation Company, a separate corporation 
(327). The water is diverted into the head of the North 
Union Canal, which has three branches: the Loveridge Lat-
eral, the Stratton Lateral and the Knight Lateral (327-
328). Below the North Union diversion on the Provo Bench 
Canal is the Nickle Ditch, dividing into the Davis Lateral, 
the North Spencer Lateral, the South Spencer Lateral and 
the Curtis Lateral (329); at about the same point, the 
Southeast Ditch diverts from the canal (330). These later-
als serve the stockholders of the Provo Bench Canal and 
Irrigation Company and the stockholders of certain other 
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canal companies flowing water through the Provo Bench 
Canal. 
The secretary of the canal company receives orders 
from the stockholders for change from one lateral to anoth-
er, if desired, and causes their water to be delivered into 
the new laterals for them (330-331); but the canal company 
has nothing to do with the administration of laterals or in 
designating their officers (333-334). 
There is no such thing as the Southeast Ditch Com-
pany, except as that refers to a group of farmers using wa-
ters from the so-called Southeast Ditch (104). They simply 
get together for the ticketing of their water and sometimes 
for mutual ditch cleaning (118). The Southeast Ditch has 
two main branches and numerous sub-laterals, one serving 
forty-eight users and the one leading to the Roy Davis cor-
ner serving fifty users (365-366). Christenson is the low-
est user on the latter branch (124; 365). This is his own 
ditch (124) and it terminates at his fence line on the east 
side of Main Street about 500 feet north of the West Union 
Canal bridge across Main Street, near the so-called Davis 
Corner, at which point it is very small (123). The South-
east Ditch, however, does not run to the road, but ends at 
the Christenson farm, which is the last place served by that 
particular branch of the ditch (112; 124). The ditch is 
about 2^2 miles from its head to the head of the north 
branch (372). 
Besides the two main branches mentioned, various oth-
er laterals take off on either side of the Southeast Ditch 
to serve water users in the general vicinity; some ditches 
serve only one water user, and others a large number. 
There are a total of about seventy individual users on the 
Southeast Ditch (117). This ditch has been substantially in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
the same position and has been operated in substantially the 
same way for at least forty years (124; 121). 
An arrangement has been made by stockholders get-
ting their water in the Southeast Ditch to care for any un-
used or surplus water in the ditch. A steel gate has been 
placed near the head, so that people who do not want to 
use their turns can notify Roy Olsen, who shuts the water 
off for their own protection. All stockholders know this 
(112-113; 368; 374). The canal company has no control 
over this gate (368). Surplus water also can be turned 
down the north branch of the ditch, from which it is im-
possible for water to get into the West Union Canal (375). 
Stockholders on each of the main laterals leading from 
the Provo Bench Canal, for the purpose of cleaning the 
canal and providing for the distribution of water between 
them, appoint a ditch secretary, and some have a board or 
committee for the purpose of determining the period of wa-
ter turn per share which is to be allowed in the ditch (109). 
The Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company has 
nothing to do with this (110). The secretary of the ditch 
is notified by the secretary of the Provo Bench Canal and 
Irrigation Company each year how many shares of water 
are being distributed to the ditch in accordance with the 
request of the stockholders (119; 342). The ditch then al-
locates the turns among the stockholders on the ditch in 
accordance with their stock holdings (110). Except for 
certifying the number of shares on the ditch, including the 
number of shares of Provo Reservoir Corporation stock and 
Tanner stock flowed through the canal in an arrangement 
with the Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Company (126-
127), the canal company has never assumed anything to 
do with the distribution of the water of the respective lat-
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erals or ditches (110; 128; 352-353), simply diverting into 
the head of the respective laterals the amount of water 
called for by the total number of shares represented on the 
lateral (123). The individual stockholders have the right 
to use the flow of water through the ditch (120). The canal 
company delivers water at the head of the Southeast Ditch 
to the seventy users on the ditch entitled thereto (123). 
The Provo Reservoir Company, a separate corporation, 
rents water to various people using such water through the 
Southeast Ditch also. They have both Provo Bench and 
Provo Reservoir water in the ditch (126) and also Tanner 
water (128). 
The evidence further discloses that all of the water 
turned into each lateral during every period of the irriga-
tion season, has been allocated by the stockholders on the 
lateral into turns, there being no period when someone has 
not been assignd the use of the water (369). 
The opinion further concludes that it "is uncontradic-
ted that in the Spring before the water was turned into the 
ditches, the plaintiff notified the defendant at a meeting of 
its Board of Dirctors that in the past water has escaped 
from the Southeast Ditch through the road at Main Street 
and into plaintiff's canal, thereby causing damage.,, The 
opinion does not seem to recognize the evidence that this 
complaint was relayed to the users on the various laterals 
with information as to their responsibility for the water de-
livered in accordance with their orders to the head of the 
laterals. It does not seem to follow that merely by mak-
ing complaint, the West Union Canal Company could hold 
the appellant company as a virtual insuror when the respon-
sibility did not rest in fact or law upon the latter canal com-
pany. 
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The fact remains that appellant had been operating in 
the same manner and the Southeast Ditch and the water 
users thereon had been assuming indpendent control in the 
same manner for more than forty years, and the record 
does not show any difficulty on, or from, the Southeast 
Ditch previous to the year in question. 
The times and order of use and application of water by 
several landowners under the same lateral to their respec-
tive tracts of land are matters of no concern to the water 
company, where the several users, by agreement among 
themselves, distribute and use the water at the times and 
in the manner agreeable to them, and the company has no 
duty but that of seeing that the requested quantity of wa-
ter flows through the headgate into the consumers' ditch. 
Helphery, et al v. Perrault, et al (Idaho) 86 Pac. 417; Long 
on Irrigation, Second Ed., para. 172, page 307. 
II. The decisiojn announces an erroneous and impractical 
rule of law. 
The opinion as to responsibility of canal companies in 
the event of rain, and otherwise, would furnish a danger-
ous precedent without legal justification, making impracti-
cal the administration of canal companies, and encouraging 
irresponsibility on the part of users. 
Under this division of the argument, perhaps we can 
best express the natural concern of appellant and others in 
its position by mentioning two concrete illustrations based 
upon the record, and related matters of common knowledge: 
(a) A canal company, in accordance with the order 
of its respective stockholders, delivers water into five, ten 
or fifty different laterals, for the most part by means of 
dividers in its canal, dividing the water equitably during 
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the irrigation season. Each one of these laterals is again 
divided into few or numerous sub-laterals or ditches, serv-
ing verying numbers of users under a system worked out 
by the users on the laterals and ditches. Each sub-ditch, 
served by ditches which in turn are served by such laterals, 
must have an end on someone's farm somewhere, because 
in most cases, it would be impossible for them to lead back 
again to the source of supply. 
Query: Is it the responsibility of the canal company 
to follow through each lateral, through each ditch and down 
each sub-ditch, the latter of which may total literally hun-
dreds, and to insist that each end of each sub-ditch is so ex-
tended past the last user's land and into a natural or other 
water course, so that if this lower user or some one of the 
users up above does not use his turn, and does not make 
arrangements for someone else to use it, the water will not 
flood off the lower user's land and do the lower user, or 
someone else, damage? 
(b) In view of the same system, which is typical of 
practically every irrigation company in the State, assuming 
that the duty devolves upon the canal company, as the opin-
ion indicates, in the event of rain, to anticipate that some 
irrigators on laterals, sub-laterals or ditches at points re-
mote from the canal may not use their allotted turns and 
to therefore turn the water out of the lateral, how can such 
canal company so predict the prospective amount of rain-
fall to determine how much water should be turned out, 
or, if all water should be turned out, for what period? 
We have heretofore referred to the claimed facts on 
which the opinion is founded, and have pointed out that 
some of the facts therein assumed are not supported by the 
record and are contrary to the record. 
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Based upon such incorrect assumptions, the opinion in 
the brief paragraph containing the ruling to which we ex-
cept, approves a doctrine which could only lead to great 
mischief when its says: 
"Under these circumstances, defendant should 
have realized that to allow a substantial stream of wa-
ter to continue to course into the Southeast Ditch dur-
ing that night, it was apt to cause damage to plaintiff's 
canal ,as it did. It should have been clear that in such 
a night few, if any, persons would be using the water 
in that ditch and that if it was allowed to run to the 
end of the ditch it would eventually flow into the road 
at Christenson's farm and from there into the plain-
tiff's canal. Its failure to use reasonable care in prop-
erly regulating the flow of water in the Southeast Ditch 
was therefore the proximate cause of plaintiff's dam-
age." 
Such a determination is fallacious and laden with dan-
ger, because: 
(A) It places a wholly unrealistic and impractical 
burden upon canal companies to check with every variant 
development of weather as to the desires of hundreds of 
water users without any possibility of performance. 
(B) It assumes that farmers do not use irrigation 
water during rainy periods. As a matter of fact, as shown 
by the record, and as a matter of common knowledge of 
which the Court should take judicial notice, irrigation dur-
ing rain storms is a most beneficial practice. Many prac-
tical irrigators are even more anxious to utilize their water 
during rain than at any other time, as the water can cover 
the ground with loss at a minimum, thereby fully saturat-
ing the soil to the desired depth in a manner in which heavy 
rains seldom do. 
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(C) It places upon the canal company the burden of 
being infallible prophets as to the extent of the rain, both 
as to quantity and area, and as to whether stockholders 
would desire or need water, and as to the amount. The 
area covered by laterals and sub-laterals extending from 
the Provo Bench Canal extends north and south about ten 
miles and east and west more than three miles, comprising 
canals and irrigation ditches hundreds of miles in length. 
(D) It confronts canal companies with the insupport-
able legal dilemna of either permitting water during rains 
to run into the heads of the numerous laterals in accord-
ance with the orders of the users served by them and there-
by inviting liability under the decision for any damage that 
might result from the non-use by a single user, or to cut 
the water out of the laterals and thereby invite liability for 
damages suffered by the numerous users thereunder who 
require and desire their turns. 
Failure to deliver water to which a stockholder is en-
titled in accordance with his order is a breach of legal du-
ty for which damages lie; and the company may be com-
pelled by mandamus to deliver such water. Long on Irri-
gation, Second Edition, para. 290, p. 505. Kinney on Irri-
gation and Water Rights, Second Edition, Vol. 3, para. 1487, 
pp. 2673-4. See also Baird vs. Upper Canal & Irrigation 
Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 Pac. 1060. 
By turning the water out of the Southeast Ditch or 
any one or more of the numerous laterals to which the com-
pany is obligated to deliver water in accordance with the 
orders of its stockholders, the company would be depriving 
numerous users in such laterals of their water. It would 
seem no defense that the company thought it might rain 
or might continue to rain, and that some one or more of 
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the users might not use his water. The obvious answer 
would be that irrigation is beneficial and most often highly 
necessary during rainy periods. 
Once the water were turned out, it would be impos-
sible to get the water back in, particularly in the lower 
areas, within several hours, as the new stream might have 
to travel several miles, and indeed in the Southeast Ditch 
might have to travel three or four miles to get to the user 
whose turn might be interrupted. 
The opinion assumed that the company should have 
known that if the water were permitted to run in the South-
east Ditch during rains, it would cause damage, and yet the 
evidence shows the system of not turning the water out 
during the irrigation season and of assuming no control on 
the Southeast Ditch, but leaving such control to the users 
thereon, had been employed for more than forty years, with 
only one instance of previous damage, and that upon atten-
tion being called to such damage, the canal company 
promptly notified the ditch committees in charge of the dist-
ribution on the laterals of their responsibility. 
(E) There being no standard by which the duty of 
the canal company could be measured under the opinion, 
the conclusion of the Court that the appellant was negli-
gent for "its failure to use reasonable care in properly regu-
lating the flow . . . . " simply places responsibility 
upon it as an insuror, making the furnishing of water to 
laterals at its peril in any event. This is at variance with 
the great weight of authority. This would make the ad-
ministration of canal companies so impractical and specu-
lative as to seriously handicap all users. 
(F) It approves the irresponsibility of users having 
control of their own water on laterals, sub-laterals and 
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branch ditches, and invites them to let their water run at 
random with the assurance that they may shift responsi-
bility to the canal company. 
In the instant case, there was no proof whatsoever that 
any individual user failed to use his turn. It was the con-
tention of the defendants throughout the trial that the wa-
ter running on the road came from another source. If the 
respondent relied upon the non-use of his turn by some 
stockholder, it should have proved it. It did not do so, and 
it is most probable that flood waters from rain in the area 
of the lower ditch were responsible for the washing at the 
Davis Corner. Be this as it may, the opinion will encourage 
non-use and irresponsibility on the part of individual users 
and ditch committees in the future. We are concerned here 
not with the sufficiency of evidence, but with the dangerous 
legal precedent involved. 
In the first volume of the Pacific Reporter appears a 
case basing recovery for damage upon the principles of con-
trol and negligence. Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 63, 1 
Pac. 160 (1881). In that case it was held that since the 
city had under its control and management the ditch in 
question, and there was evidence of negligence proximately 
resulting in plaintiff's damage, the granting of a non-suit 
was error. There the city having control of the ditch had 
failed to allocate one turn of water, and it was during this 
period that the damage occurred. In the instant case ap-
pellant had no control of the ditch or the allocation of turns, 
but the water users on the Southeast Ditch had themselves 
allocated every minute of the flow. 
In the second appeal of the same case, reported in 5 
Utah 302,16 Pac. 598 (1887), the Supreme Court reiterated 
the above generally accepted basis of liability and reiter-
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ated the determinative effect of the issue as to whether the 
ditches in question were under the control of the city (p. 
603). The Court added, however, (p. 604) that "We do 
not mean to say that property owners may not so interfere 
or assume control over a ditch as to release the city from 
its duty . . . ." 
In the case of Jensen v. Davis and Weber Counties 
Canal Company, 44 Utah 10,137 Pac. 635 (1913), reference 
was made to the statutes requiring the owners of any canal 
to maintain the same, it being held that the owners were 
required to exercise ordinary care in this respect. In the 
cases of Chipman, et al v. American Fork City, et al, 46 
Utah 134, 148 Pac. 1103 (1915) and 54 Utah 93, 179 Pac. 
742 (1919), involved a ditch constructed by the defendant 
and over which it had assumed control. In Burtenshaw 
v. Bountiful Irr. Co., 90 Utah 196, 61 P. 2d 312 (1936), the 
distribution system of the defendant company and its neg-
ligence in respect thereof were involved, and in disapprov-
ing a proposed construction, the court recognized the dif-
ference between the actual duty of delivering water to a 
common point and the claimed duty of delivering it to the 
individual user. Finally, in Briaii v. Freemont Irr. Co., 
Utah_ , 186 P. 2d 588 (1947), a complaint 
against an irrigation company was held insufficient on de-
murrer because no breach of duty was shown, it being com-
mented that it was the duty of the user of water to return 
surplus water to the stream. Even in Lisonbee vs. Monroe 
Irr. Co., 18 Utah 343, 54 Pac. 1009, upon which re-
spondent mainly relied, the control and ownership of the 
ditch were admitted, and it was recognized that the canal 
company was responsible only for its own negligence. 
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All through the adjudicated cases in this and other 
jurisdictions from the earliest decisions to the present time, 
liability has been premised, if found to exist at all, on proof 
of ownership and/or control of the ditch in question and 
upon generally accepted principles of liability for negligence. 
The decision in this case represents a dangerous departure, 
fastening liability without proof of ownership, control or 
negligence. 
HI. That a modification of the decision is essential in the 
public interest, as well as in justice to the appellant. 
Apart from the insufficiency of the evidence and other 
matters of importance mainly in this case, the decision 
should be modified and clarified so as not to harrass canal 
companies by impractical and onerous standards, invite 
false liabilities and shift responsibility merely because claim-
ants in the position of respondents cannot show, or fail to 
show, any delict by water users themselves. 
The import of this decision cannot be overestimated. 
If it is permitted to stand, an injustice will be done to appel-
lant in requiring it to pay a judgment which it not suppor-
ted by the commonly accepted standards of liability. The 
amount involved is not too important. The ruling of the 
Court on sufficiency of the evidence, even in view of the 
wholly speculative nature of such evidence may not be con-
sidered of supreme importance, but the erroneous principle 
of law as to the liability of canal companies announced by 
the Court is of great significance. The effect upon appel-
lant's future operations and upon those of all similar com-
panies in the State will be far-reaching and serious. Its 
effect upon the individual water users themselves will be 
burdensome, because it will make difficult the expeditious 
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and proper delivery of their water to the laterals which 
serve them without onerous restrictions and conditions. 
The cause should be re-heard, further oral arguments 
permitted, and upon such re-hearing, the decision modified 
to reverse the judgment of the lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Petitioner and 
Appellant. 
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